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Scale Inside-out: Rapid Cloud DDoS Attack
Absorption and Mitigation
Gaurav Somani, Member, IEEE, Manoj Singh Gaur, Member, IEEE, Dheeraj Sanghi,
Mauro Conti, Senior Member, IEEE, and Muttukrishnan Rajarajan, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—DDoS attack mitigation requires quick absorption
of attack data which is usually achieved by dynamically scaling
the cloud resources to quickly identify the onslaught features to
combat the attack. The scaled resources come with an additional
cost which may prove to be a huge unplanned cost in the cases
of longer, sophisticated and repetitive attacks. In this work,
we address an important problem, whether the victim service
resource scaling during attack, always result in rapid DDoS
mitigation. For this purpose, we conduct real-time DDoS attack
experiments to study the attack absorption and attack mitigation
for various target services in the presence of dynamic scaling. We
found that the activities such as attack absorption which provide
timely attack data input to attack analytics, may be adversely
affected by the heavy resource usage generated by the attack. We
show that the operating system level local resource contention
should be reduced during attacks to expedite the overall attack
mitigation, which may not be completely solved by the dynamic
scaling of resources alone. We develop a novel relation which
terms “Resource Utilization Factor” for each incoming request
as the major component in forming the resource contention.
To overcome these issues, we propose a novel “Scale Inside-
out” approach which during attacks, reduces the “Resource
Utilization Factor” to a minimal value to quickly absorb the
attack. The proposed approach sacrifices victim service resources
and provide those resources to mitigation service in addition to
other co-located services to ascertain their availability during
attack. Experimental evaluation show up to 95% reduction
in total attack downtime of the victim service in addition to
considerable improvement in attack detection and reporting time
and downtime of co-located services.
Index Terms—Cyber Threat Intelligence, Cloud Computing,
DDoS attacks, Security and protection (e.g., firewalls).
I. INTRODUCTION
CYBER threat incidents are increasing day-by-day withchanging attack vectors. At the same time, evolution of
“Big Data” and “Security Analytics” paradigms are helping the
victims to sustain and combat the emerging cyber threats [1].
The on-demand resource capabilities provided by cloud com-
puting, fulfill the resource needs of processes involving threat
intelligence and possible mitigation[2]. Business intelligence
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and analytics are helping all the areas of e-commerce, health-
care, politics, science, security, and safety [3]. Discussion such
as the ones in [4] [5] provides a number of application areas
where the big data analytics is helping in defending the cyber
attacks. Gartner anticipated in 2014, that by 2016, “Big Data
Analytics” will have a major role in cyber security [6]. Even-
tually, a large portion of enterprises rely on security analytics
using big data and machine learning to circumvent the cyber
attacks in 2016 [7]. There is a number of reports by major
security research institutions which state about the immense
role of big data analytics in combating the flourishing cyber
attacks[8] [9] [10]. Among the large number of cyber attacks,
DDoS attack is one of the most prominent attack which has
affected a majority of organizations across the globe[11]. The
maximum DDoS attack size which was only 8 Gbps in 2004
has now increased well above 500Gbps in the year 2015.
The effects and origins of DDoS attacks saw a tremendous
variation in terms of attack scale, sources, duration, repetition
and sophistication. On the other hand, after the evolution of
utility computing models, services such “DDoS for Hire” [12]
and “DDoS Mitigation as a Service” [13] [14] are available in
the market to shape these attacks and their mitigation processes
as opponents in the “cyber war”. Most of the analytics based
DDoS defense mechanisms are mainly based on incoming
traffic feature assessment [15]. Defense methods primarily
work online and perform a threshold based anomaly detection
in the incoming traffic which follows learning based on past
attacks.
Attack data absorption is an important milestone before
triggering any analytical threat intelligence activity. Many
of the recent solutions are based on the dynamic resource
scaling which advocate to use quick deployment of enormous
resources to absorb the attack as quickly as possible [16] [17].
These solutions achieve the quick attack absorption by min-
imizing the attack surface. Though the cost implications of
the resource scaling can be against the sustainability of the
organizations in case of budgetary limitations or specially in
case of persistent, stealthy or repetitive attacks. During massive
and extreme DDoS attacks the resources of victim services, are
stressed heavily. The legitimate traffic coming to the victim
services does not get service responses during the downtime
resulted due to the attack.
The effects of the attack depends upon the target application
resource usage, as the attacks may result into an extreme
resource contention which may affect the attack absorption
and subsequent threat mitigation adversely. The resource con-
tention may be severe enough such that the mitigation methods
Page 1 of 13
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. XX, NO. Y, AUGUST 2016 2
may not get the needed resources to perform the necessary
processing in time. Additionally, the attacks may also affect
non-target co-located services on the same victim machine
which might be very critical for the recovery and monitoring
(for example a remote login utility). There are recent incidents
which even show evidences of mitigation methods/tools get-
ting attacked during DDoS attacks [18]. Additionally, attackers
are using DDoS attacks to smokescreen and perform other
severe attacks behind the DDoS attacks [19] [20].
To effectively showcase the observations made in this work,
we do extensive attack experiments on various kinds of victim
applications with resource scaling in place. We observe some
important behaviors related to the attack absorption and attack
mitigation.The resource scaling may also become less effective
in case the resource contention is not properly managed during
the attack. The major component to the heavy resource con-
tention is the “Resource Utilization Factor” for each incoming
request which if lowered down in the presence of attack,
may solve the issues related to the contention. We argue that
during the attack downtime, the easy availability of the basic
resources such as CPU, memory, disk, and bandwidth results
into quick attack absorption and subsequent attack mitigation
processes. We propose a novel mechanism to lower down the
“Resource Utilization Factor” of the victim service during the
attack. We name this approach as “Scale Inside-out” by doing
in-resource scaling of the victim application. The major idea
behind our proposed approach is to sacrifice the victim service
resources during downtime and contention to expedite the
overall attack absorption and attack mitigation processes. We
also provide a formal model of attack absorption and outline
its major requirements in this work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
shows the relationship between cyber threat intelligence and
attack absorption which forms the main basis of attack miti-
gation. We show our initial attack experiments to prepare the
requirements of effective mitigation based on the important
observations in the attack outcomes in Section III. We give
a formal model of resource utilization factor and its role in
the attack mitigation process in Section IV. In Section V,
we describe the proposed approach and its detailed working.
We give experimental evaluation in Section VI. Section VI
also provides a detailed discussion on the outcomes and their
applicability. We provide an analysis of the related work in
Section VII. Finally, we conclude our work with a light on
the future work in Section VIII.
II. CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE IN THE CLOUD
In Figure 1, We present a generic information flow dia-
gram showing the DDoS attack source, participants, target
infrastructure and cyber threat intelligence to combat any
possible attacks. DDoS attacks are normally coordinated by a
command and control server which may control a large number
of possible attack sources in the form of bot run zombie
computers. The attack sources may include phones, servers,
desktops, PDAs, cloud VMs or more recently other Internet of
Things devices (IoT). After the emergence of cloud computing
there are attack incidents which are even using cloud resources
(BotClouds) to originate such attacks as a service [21]. Most
of the recent notorious attacks are reflection and amplification
attacks which also include attacks on many popular cloud
services[11]. The share of cloud services among all the at-
tack victims worldwide has reached a considerable mark of
33%[11]. The victim services on clouds run inside virtual
machines (VMs) on a virtualized multi-tenant environment.
Cloud services are termed to show additional DDoS attack
effects due to their mutli-tenant and on-demand computing
and pricing based business model [15]. These additional attack
effects include economic losses and a number of collateral
damages on non-targets[22]. Cyber threat intelligence related
to DDoS class of attacks may intend to provide a complete
security framework which involves implementing methods to
prevent, detect and recover from DDoS attacks.
A. Input to Threat Intelligence
Detection methods are mostly functions used to identify
patterns in the incoming traffic and logs [8]. Attack data which
is mostly collected from the victim server file system/logs may
be supplemented by other collected data from other parts of
the overall network. Additional important inputs to the threat
intelligence include security analytics in the form of security
knowledge based updates about the newer threats and methods.
Additional compute, storage and bandwidth resources may
also be provided as inputs to perform the attack analytics,
associated computation, maintain the availability, fasten the
attack absorption and recovery. In many of the large scale and
sophisticated attacks, manual human intervention is required
to achieve the goals of threat intelligence. Attack absorption
is most important aspect for our work and a key ingredient
to the success of timely and efficient attack mitigation and
subsequent service availability.
B. Threat Intelligence Outcomes
Threat intelligence outcomes include identified attacks, at-
tack sources and attack vulnerabilities [8]. Attack mitigation
will have methods which will block the attack sources to
send any incoming traffic further and drop any established
attack connections. Service recovery to gain availability may
require some time due to a range of attack mitigation activities.
If the attacks remain present for longer duration or remain
undetected due to the stealthy and sophisticated nature, may
even delay the recovery further. We show in Figure 1 about
additional outcomes in the form of new and incremental
“threat knowledge” which updates the existing knowledge
base of threat intelligence. To extend our discussion towards
the major findings of our work, we expand the discussion
of the generic cyber threat intelligence towards real attack
analytics. We detail the real attack experimental study with
critical aspects of attack absorption, mitigation and recovery
in Section IV.
III. REAL-TIME ATTACKS : CRITICAL ASPECTS
The cyber threat intelligence flow discussed in Figure 1
shows attacks origin, generation, attack target and attack
Page 2 of 13
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. XX, NO. Y, AUGUST 2016 3
Victim VM
Cloud Infrastructure
Attack Identification
Attack Mitigation
Service Recovery
Intelligence Updates
Attackers
Attack Data
Target Defense
Resources      Cyber 
    Threat 
Intelligence
Network Data
Security Analytics
Fig. 1: Cyber Threat Intelligence and Role of Attack Absorption
mitigation. In this section, we will try to see the attack
dynamics from its origin to detection and mitigation with
the help of real attack experiments. To achieve these aims,
we use an attacking cloud and a victim cloud running VMs
as attack and defense infrastructure respectively. We show
various configuration settings related to the attack experiments
in Table I and the experimental setup in Figure 2. The victim
service is a dynamic file conversion website which converts
an image from one format to another format on each service
request. In this set of experiments, we are using .jpeg images
of size 2MB to a .png image. On the other hand, we send
attack traffic with 500 concurrent requests from a single attack
VM. We do not send the attack traffic from multiple sources
to achieve a deterministic attack detection time over multiple
repetitions of the experiments. In case of multiple sources, the
attack detection time varies depending upon the connection
share of each attack source in the total number of established
connections at victim server end. Moreover, the main focus of
our experiments is on the attack absorption and its subsequent
mitigation at the victim side which are purely victim side
processes. We planned the attack traffic with the help of the
classical work [23].
     Attack 
Infrastructure
    Victim 
Infrastructure
Attack VM Victim Web Service
Benign User
Administrator
(SSH)
Fig. 2: Experimental Setup
To demonstrate the service availability behavior of the
victim service under attack, we use a host to send benign traffic
by sending one concurrent request for a total of 100 requests.
We are also interested to see the behavior and performance
of other critical services which are co-hosted with victim
service on the same VM. For this purpose, we design a test
to assess the availability of secure shell (ssh) by sending a
ssh session request, establishment, and session close cycle.
Test for ssh represents the communication medium by which
the VM/victim service owner connects to the service. We
scheduled the attack experiments in a manner such that the
attack traffic, benign traffic and ssh requests are launched at
the same time. We also aim at analyzing the performance
dynamics of attack absorption and other important attack
mitigation and availability concerns while the victim VM gets
more resources. For this purpose, in Set 1 experiments, we
provide resources equivalent to an EC2 “C4” instance [24]. In
Set 2, we expand these resources to see the attack dynamics
with resources twice of C4 resources. We term Set 2 resources
equal to two C4 instances. We expand these services to as
high as four times as that of the basic C4 resources in Set 3
which are equivalent to four C4 instances. Instead of scaling
the resources dynamically while the attack is present, we do
three separate attack experiments to observe the effects on
service downtime, attack detection time, and performance of
other services. We study the attack mitigation behavior by
placing a generic DDoS mitigation mechanism in place.
Resource Configuration Settings
A
tta
ck
Se
tti
ng
s
Physical server Dell PowerEdge R630
Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2670
v3, 8 processors (4 cores each)
total memory 96GB
Service ApacheBench2
Configuration 2 vCPUs and 4 GB
Traffic rate 500 concurrent requests
(Total 5000 requests)
V
ic
tim
Se
tti
ng
s Physical server Dell PowerEdge R630
Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2670
v3, 8 processors (4 cores each)
total memory 96GB
Service Image conversion web service
Configuration 4 vCPUs and 8 GB (Set 1)
8 vCPUs and 16 GB (Set 2)
16 vCPUs and 32 GB (Set 3)
O
th
er
Se
tti
ng
s
Benign Service 2 vCPUs and 4 GB
Traffic rate 1 concurrent web request
(Total 100 requests)
SSH request response cycles
(Total 500 requests)
OS Ubuntu 14.04
Network Speed 1Gbps
Hypervisor XenServer 6.5
TABLE I: Attack Experiment Detailed Settings
We use “DDoS-Deflate” which is one of the popular
open source DDoS mitigation tools which detects the attacks
sources on the basis of a threshold on maximum number of
connections [25] by a source. The detected attack sources are
then suitably blocked by a firewall such as iptables [26].
The main motivation behind using this specific method is due
to its popular and widespread use in DDoS detection.
It is also a generic representation of many other DDoS
mitigation methods which work on incoming traffic features.
Our results and their suitability is not dependent on the
DDoS mitigation tools and any other similar DDoS mitigation
tool can be used as a replacement. Additionally, in order to
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Resources Time of Time of Downtime Time to Maximum Minimum Average
Attack Attack of Victim complete Response Response Response
Detection (s) Reporting (s) Service (s) the requests (s) Time (s) Time (s) Time
Set 1 Unknown 2481 2481 2911.34 1507.68 4.053 29.11
Set 2 Unknown 931 931 1367.19 593.371 4.065 13.67
Set 3 41.58 41.58 971 1384.13 956.895 4.071 13.8413
TABLE II: Performance of DDoS mitigation service during attacks
Resources Downtime Time to Maximum Minimum Average
of ssh complete Response Response Response
service (s) ssh requests (s) Time (ssh) (s) Time (ssh) (s) Time (ssh) (s)
Set 1 2269.46 2373.15 706.4 0.15 4.7463
Set 2 864.2 940.657 254.88 0.147 1.88131
Set 3 0 83.309 0.475 0.145 0.166618
TABLE III: Performance of SSH request-response behavior during attacks
generalize the observations and their wider applicability we
use this generic connection based detection method. While
performing the attack experiments, we keep a close eye on
attack absorption behavior of the victim VM and the DDoS
mitigation service. We achieve this by keeping a track of
various metrics such as attack detection time, attack reporting
time, downtime of victim service, service response time,
number of attack requests served before the attack detection,
downtime of ssh service, and response time behavior. One
more behavior for which we are particularly interested to see
the attack absorption behavior is the number of established
connections during the attack period. Connection establish-
ment depends on the server resources availability and the
duration of connection cycle which comprises of connection-
establishment and connection-close cycle. We will detail about
this important factor while discussing the attack dynamics in
Section IV.
A. Results and Important Observations
Various attack outcomes are shown in Figure 3, Table II and
Table III for the three sets of victim resources, Set 1 (4 vCPUs-
8GB), Set 2 (8 vCPUs-16GB), and Set 3 (16 vCPUs-32GB).
Figure 3a shows the behavior of victim service response time
for the requests sent by the benign sender. As soon as the
attack starts the downtime of the service starts and the response
times become very high (Table II). We changed the behavior
of benign sender in such a manner that it waits for the longer
responses to come without getting timed out. The response
time behavior is having a large downtime and huge peaks in
responses in Set 1. Set 2 with increased resources settles the
downtime from a huge 2481s to 931s which is quite similar in
the case of Set 3. However, one important factor to consider
related to the attack mitigation performance is attack reporting
time. Set 1 and Set 2 victim VM is not responsive for the
whole downtime and the reporting of attack detection time is
unknown.
We configured the DDoS mitigation service in such a
manner that once the attackers are identified from the traffic
the mitigation service notifies the attack detection in an attack
log file. However, the huge resource usage during the attack
did not allow the access to VM interface and the reporting time
remains unknown till all the attack effects are not over. DDoS
mitigation service achieved the attack reporting in the case
of Set 3 resources. The behavior of other co-hosted services
(inside the same victim VM) as demonstrated by Figure 3b
and various performance metrics in Table III.
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Fig. 3: Attack effects with varied resources
The SSH service though not the real direct target of the DDoS
attack faces downtime and performance penalties in the later
part of the web-service downtime. SSH service downtime
and response time see a decremental trend from Set 1 to
Set 3. Set 3 having highest resources (Four times the Set 1
resources) sees no downtime of the SSH service, though there
are response times which are as high as thrice to the minimum
response time. In Figure 3c we show the total number of
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connections at the victim service end since the start of the
attack. Number of connections remains around 500-600 for
all the three sets. However, for the Set 1 and the Set 2, the
number of connections are unknown as the victim VM became
non-responsive and values were not retrieved after 40s-50s.
Set 3 stays at∼500 connections for most of the duration and
then a step-wise decrease is observed till all the attack effects
are over. We made the following observations during attack
experiments.
1. Resource Contention during attack: Non-responsive VM,
unknown attack detection time, unknown number of connec-
tions and huge peaks in SSH request-response cycles are
the number of observations which are the result of a heavy
resource contention formed by the DDoS attack. In addition
to just service denial during the downtime, all these effects
transforms these attacks in “extreme DDoS” attacks. Resource
contentions occur due to heavy resource usage by victim
service and no timely resource availability to other important
processes at the operating system level. Resource contention
and the absence of performance isolation are important issues
while designing operating system and virtual machine moni-
tors [27], [28], [29]. Resource contention should be minimized
as this is an important effect of DDoS attacks and also a major
contributor to the other three observations.
2. Downtime Post-attack Detection: Even though the attack
detection time is unknown in the cases of Set 1 and Set 2 due to
the heavy resource contention, in Set 3 it is around 41s. Still in
Set 3, the service downtime is 971s. After detecting the attack,
the DDoS mitigation service with the help of the firewall
drops all the incoming attack connections from identified
attackers. In addition to this, the DDoS mitigation services
tries to remove all the connections which are established by
the attackers. Connection removal is achieved by reseting the
connections by utilities such as tcpkill. The removal of
these connections also take up a considerable amount of time
due to heavy resource usage as all these connections are
already having requests which are served by the victim service.
In order to minimize the overall downtime, the post-attack
detection downtime should also be minimized.
3. Number of Connections: In all the three set of experiments,
we observe the stability of number of connections to 500-
600, which is the major reason behind the high post-attack
mitigation time. We also increased the environment variables
such as maximum number of connections and port-ranges,
still the number of connections remains stable. Number of
connections decide the overall attack surface on the victim
and should be maximized to absorb the attack traffic as soon
as it arrives.
4. Collateral Effects on Other Services: We see adverse
performance on SSH service in Figure 3b. SSH service is
very light resource usage utility as compared to the co-hosted
dynamic website. Still, the SSH request-response cycle is
severely affected by the large resource contended downtime.
We observe similar effects by non-responsive VM, unknown
attack detection time, and unknown number of connections.
Reduction in the contention may also solve the collateral
damages. We will use the above observations in preparing the
requirements for the proposed approach.
IV. FORMALIZING DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS
We formally define important requirements keeping the
four important observations we made during the attack
experiments in Section III. For this purpose, we first define
a DDoS Attack mitigation activity as a three stage process
(also shown in Figure 4).
Stage 1
Stage 2
Stage 3
Attack Absorption
Attack Identification
   and Mitigation
Post-attack-detection 
   time to Recovery
Fig. 4: Three Stages of DDoS Attack Mitigation
Stage 1. Attack Absorption: In absorption, the mitigation
method tries to absorb the traffic as soon as it arrives on the
network interface. Traffic input comes through the network
connections and absorption gets affected if the victim service
is not able to create quick connections.
Stage 2. Attack Identification and Mitigation: Attack
absorption is an online activity which always runs to ensure
the timely traffic assessment and threat analytics. Attack
identification and mitigation (blocking and dropping the attack
connections) are completely causally dependent on the attack
absorption. Resource availability to DDoS mitigation service
and other critical services must be ensured to have resource
contention free attack mitigation. Each incoming request is
the contributor to the resource usage, and a huge number of
requests during the DDoS attack forms the contention.
Stage 3. Post-Attack Detection to Recovery: Quick service
recovery is dependent on the timely attack absorption and
mitigation. Quick removal of established attack connections
is the key to minimize the time required to achieve service
availability post-attack detection.
The performance of the attack absorption stage is completely
dependent on the attack absorption delay. Attack absorption
delay (Tabsorb), which is the difference between the time at
which the traffic flow reaches the victim interface (Tinter f ace)
to the time when it is actually within the reach of the DDoS
mitigation service (TDMS). We define attack absorption delay
with the help of the following equation.
Tabsorb = TDMS − Tinter f ace . (1)
Victim VMs are provided certain basic resources such as
vCPUs (C), memory (M), disk (D) and the bandwidth (B).
We define the resource allocation to a VM as its capacity.
Resources(Vi) =< Ci,Mi,Di, Bi > . (2)
The actual capacity of a victim server running inside the VM
is usually represented by the total number of simultaneous
requests it can serve at the same time. The number of requests
(r) which the service will be able to serve depends upon the
resource requirements of each request. We define the resource
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requirements of each request, r , with the help of the resource
utilization factor, S(r), which is the total resource requirements
to complete a request r . Processing a request requires access
to few or all of the basic resources.
Sr =< Cr,Mr,Dr, Br > . (3)
We define the capacity of the victim VM by the following
equation where the VM, Vi is able to serve N requests.
Capacity(Vi) = N ∗ S(r). (4)
We assume that the victim service has a defined set of require-
ments for achieving a minimum quality of service (QoS) in
order to have timely and correct output. The maximum number
of requests (Nmax) which can be served by the victim service
with the required QoS, are given by
Nmax =
Capacity(Vi)
Sr
. (5)
In order to extend the notion of resources, we also utilize
the maximum number of connections (Cmax) as an important
resource of the victim service. We assume that we can only
maximize the Nmax value if we are able to establish as
many connections (maximizing Cmax) as possible. It is evident
from Equation 5 that if we want to maximize the number of
maximum requests (Nmax) which can be served by the victim
service, we need to either increase the Capacity(Vi) or reduce
the Sr . Following are the ways/requirements of a mitigation
method by which the attack absorption can be expedited:
R1. Tabsorb Reduction: During an attack, the number of
connection requests coming to the victim service are huge. The
time at which the traffic reaches the interface and transforms
in the form of established connections is an important delay
which is actually the Tabsorb (attack absorption delay). For
the cases where the mitigation methods filter more fine grain
features, the attack absorption delay may be extended to
serving the initial requests (index page) and then allowing the
additional requests to enter the service. These requests might
be waiting to enter the service queue or they may be even
retransmissions. The delay Tabsorb can be minimized if the
connection life-cycle and the delay in providing the incoming
traffic features to the DDoS mitigation service can be reduced.
R2. Sr Reduction: Resource utilization factor Sr comprises of
multiple activities at the service end for each incoming request.
As per Equation 5, reduction in Sr will lead to increase in
Nmax and reduction in Tabsorb . Additionally, reduction in Sr
may also lead to minimizing of the resource contention effects
as all the three stages of mitigation process run in parallel
to each other and resource contention shows adverse effects
on the parallel activities. Reducing Sr is not straightforward
as it denotes the resource usage of each incoming request
processing and responding with a suitable request outcome.
R3. Capacity(Vi) Scaling: The auto-scaling capabilities of
cloud computing facilitate dynamic resource scaling, on the
go, without any noticeable downtime in VM stop-resume.
Capacity scaling can be achieved with the help of vertical
or horizontal resource scaling as described in [30][31]. As
described earlier the resource scaling comes with an additional
cost. By increasing Capacity(Vi), it is assumed that the attack
Connection Request
Read Request
Process Request
Send Response
Connection Close
CPU Usage
Memory Usage
Disk Usage
Bandwidth Usage
Prepare Response
Connection Request
Read Request
Send Response
Connection Close
Fig. 5: Scale Inside-out the Resource Utilization Factor
absorption will be quick and the Tabsorb will be minimized
by increasing the Nmax (in turn Cmax). In next Section V, we
detail our approach by addressing these three requirements.
V. OUR PROPOSAL: THE SCALE INSIDE-OUT APPROACH
We now address the attack mitigation requirements detailed
in Section IV by describing the novel solution elements
incorporated in the proposed approach. The main contributions
of our work lies in providing quick attack mitigation by
combating the four important attack observations made in the
attack experiments in Section III. We address the problem of
reduction in attack absorption delay, Tabsorb , by reducing the
resource utilization factor Sr . In the client server architec-
ture of web-service such as the one which we used in our
experiments, there are number of activities related to each
request. Receiving a connection request, reading the request,
processing the request, preparing a reply, sending a response,
and closing the connection are few essential activities which a
server end normally performs during a request-response cycle.
Processing a request requires utilizing various resources such
as CPU, memory, disk and the bandwidth. We show all these
activities as part of the resource utilization factor in Figure 5.
DDoS attacks being a onslaught having a huge number
of such requests will create a heavy resource usage adding
individual resource utilization factor of each request which
consequently forms the resource contention problem for all
the basic resources such as CPU and memory. Though DDoS
mitigation service in our experiments is a very low resource
usage based service, still, the resource contention severely
affects the overall attack mitigation process. Additionally,
we saw in the attack experiments in Section III, scaling of
victim service resources to four times also does not solve
the problem of attack downtime, specially the post-attack
mitigation downtime. Meeting requirement R3 alone does not
solve the local operating system level resource contention
completely and comes with an additional cost.
We calculated the cost of various web services in the form of
an estimate of their resource utilization factor and summarized
in Table IV. We show the amount of time taken and the total
number of system calls executed by the victim web service
using different image sizes. We can see that the utilization of
various resources is reflected in the time taken to perform the
request and it increases with the size of the image. We use
this fact in our novel approach “Scale Inside-out”, where in
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Algorithm 1: Scale Inside Out Algorithm
SCALE-INSIDE-OUT;
Data: Response time = Tresponse,
Request timeout =Ttimeout ,
Cnow= No. of connections,
Cattack = Minimum connections during an attack,
Sattack = Resource Utilization Factor during attack,
Sr = Resource Utilization Factor without an attack,
V = Victim service;
Result: Attack Mitigated
Start;
while (Tresponse < Ttimeout && Cnow <= Cmax) do
Nothing
end
ScaleInsideOut(V , Sattack);
while (Tresponse >= Ttimeout && (Cnow >= Cmax) do
Nothing;
end
ScaleInsideOut(V , Sr );
Show “Attack Mitigated”;
end
Algorithm 2: Function ScaleInsideOut()
ScaleInsideOut();
Data: Web service W
Resource utilization factor = U,
Result: Updated Resource Utilization Factor
initialization;
Apply U to web service W ;
end
addition to capacity scaling, we argue to perform an internal
application scaling to reduce the resource utilization factor
during a DDoS attack. We term our approach as “Scale Inside-
out” as it reduces the request processing (by reducing Sr ) to
increase Nmax and Cmax which in turn minimizes, Tabsorb .
To achieve this goal, we skip all the activities between “read
request” and “send response” as shown in Figure 5. By doing
the reduction in Sr , only during the attack period, we argue that
the resource contention and all the subsequent problems like
attack absorption delay, post-attack mitigation downtime, and
collateral damages are resolved. We show the working of this
approach using algorithms 1 and 2. We test the applicability
of our method by a quick and dirty check in which we keep
checking response time of the service and the total number of
connections available on the victim service.
To demonstrate the applicability, we use thresholds Ttimeout
and Cattack which best describes the attack situation by having
a timeout value and the minimum number of connections
during an attack. Whenever the response time becomes higher
than the acceptable response time and the number of connec-
tions (Cnow) become more than or equal to Cattack , the “Scale
Inside-out” approach changes the resource utilization factor
of the victim web-service from Sr to Sattack . We observe
the resource utilization factor changing back to its original
value once the service is restored back. The major motivation
Web Execution Execution Execution Total number
Service Time Time Time of system calls
Type (real) (user) (system) executed
2KB 0m0.036s 0m0.028s 0m0.004s 771
50KB 0m0.042s 0m0.036s 0m0.004s 811
100KB 0m0.155s 0m0.144s 0m0.008s 945
500KB 0m0.792s 0m0.788s 0m0.000s 1827
1MB 0m1.937s 0m1.904s 0m0.028s 3227
2MB 0m4.078s 0m4.032s 0m0.040s 5974
TABLE IV: Resource Utilization Factor of different services
behind “Scale Inside-out” approach is that during the attack
downtime, it is fine to sacrifice the victim service resources
to expedite all the three stages of attack mitigation if the
mitigation method minimized the downtime and other effects.
“Scale Inside-out” works as a supporting resource framework
which tries to minimize the attack downtime, minimize the
effects on the legitimate users with an aim of working with
any kind of DDoS mitigation service.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
In order to analyze the efficacy of the “Scale Inside-
out” (SIO) approach, we perform exhaustive real time attack
experiments. We use various image sizes (2KB, 50KB, 100KB,
500KB, 1MB, and 2MB) and resources (Set 1, Set 2, and
Set 3) and apply the “Scale Inside-out” approach to evaluate
various metrics such as attack detection time, attack reporting
time, service downtime, and post-attack detection time. Sim-
ilarly, we collect various metrics for other critical services to
observe the resource contention and collateral damages. The
major motivation of using three sets of resources is to show
the effects of capacity scaling on the mitigation performance.
The experimental settings are similar to what we see in Table I
and Figure 2 in Section III.
We show the detailed results on effects of “Scale Inside-
out” on victim web service performance in Table V and
Table VI. We will first describe the patterns in the results
related to the victim service performance with the help of
Figure 6. Figure 6a shows the response time behavior to the
benign user while we do not employ the proposed approach
for Set 1 resources. In this case, we observe that the attack
detection time (‘D’ as shown after the vertical arrow on the
graph) is not known till the attack effects are completely over.
Attack reporting time (‘R’) and attack detection time (‘D’)
are only observed after the victim service achieves the service
availability state (‘A’). The heavy resource contention also
resulted in the unavailability of VM interface as well as longer
peaks in the response time behavior. On the other hand after
applying the “Scale Inside-out” approach to help the attack
mitigation expedition, the web service response is similar to
the Figure 6b.
The three important metrics, the attack detection time (D),
the attack reporting time (R) and the service availability (A),
are heavily reduced to around 40s. Additionally, the post-attack
detection time, reduces to nearly 0s, which is quite high in
the cases where we do not employ the “Scale Inside-out”
approach. After the reduction of the resource utilization factor
from Sr to Sattack , all the benign requests are given a response
which is not useful for them. Therefore, the response time
behavior as shown in the Table VI shows a huge reduction
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Fig. 6: Web response (before and after Scale Inside Out)
R
es
ou
rc
es Type Time of Time of Time of Time of Downtime Downtime Time to Time to
Attack Attack Attack Attack of Victim of Victim complete complete
Detection Detection Reporting Reporting Service Service the requests the requests
(no SIO) (with SIO) (no SIO) (with SIO) (no SIO) (with SIO) (no SIO) (with SIO)
Se
t
1
2KB 37.24 38.13 37.24 38.13 43 38 45.859 5.376
50KB 41.25 39.17 41.25 39.17 645 38 647.4 5.621
100KB 41.3 41.21 41.3 41.21 944 45 957 5.834
500KB 38.28 42.23 38.28 42.23 945 38 1024.31 6.949
1MB 39.35 41.24 39.35 41.24 875 40 1053.64 7.758
2MB Unknown 40.29 2481 40.29 2481 53 2911.34 14.139
Se
t
2
2KB 41.49 41.14 41.49 41.14 47 37 49.5 4.921
50KB 41.44 41.14 41.44 41.14 643 44 645.87 4.882
100KB 39.45 42.14 39.45 42.14 940 37 953.26 4.977
500KB 41.55 38.14 41.55 38.14 946 39 1023.82 5.416
1MB 40.36 42.14 40.36 42.14 947 40 1137.54 5.98
2MB Unknown 43.18 931 43.18 931 40 1367.19 6.081
Se
t
3
2KB 36.54 41.14 36.54 41.14 43 37 44.212 4.921
50KB 36.54 41.14 36.54 41.14 638 44 640.711 4.882
100KB 36.7 42.14 36.7 42.14 937 37 949.46 4.977
500KB 38.63 38.14 38.63 38.14 940 39 1017.6 5.416
1MB 38.53 42.14 38.53 42.14 943 40 1131.63 5.98
2MB 41.58 43.18 41.58 43.18 971 40 1384.13 6.081
TABLE V: Performance of DDoS mitigation service during attacks (before and after “Scale Inside-out” (all in seconds))
R
es
ou
rc
es Type Maximum Maximum Minimum Minimum Average Average
Response Response Response Response Response Response
Time Time Time Time Time Time
(no SIO) (with SIO) (no SIO) (with SIO) (no SIO) (with SIO)
Se
t1
2KB 6.425 2.261 0.024 0.019 0.46 0.05376
50KB 602.6 2.165 0.031 0.021 6.47 0.05621
100KB 597.98 1.926 0.134 0.022 9.57 0.05834
500KB 942.127 1.508 0.769 0.018 10.24 0.06949
1MB 822.437 7.732 1.907 0.018 10.53 0.07758
2MB 1507.68 14.088 4.053 0.022 29.11 0.14139
Se
t2
2KB 6.561 2.194 0.024 0.019 0.49 0.04921
50KB 602.732 2.058 0.031 0.021 6.45 0.04882
100KB 603.4 2.636 0.134 0.014 9.53 0.04977
500KB 642.263 1.57 0.776 0.014 10.2382 0.05416
1MB 944.613 2.346 1.919 0.019 11.37 0.0598
2MB 593.371 3.017 4.065 0.018 13.67 0.06081
Se
t3
2KB 6.369 2.194 0.024 0.019 0.44 0.04921
50KB 602.4 2.058 0.03 0.021 6.4 0.04882
100KB 900.869 2.636 0.134 0.014 9.4946 0.04977
500KB 902.034 1.57 0.776 0.014 10.176 0.05416
1MB 641.035 2.346 1.91 0.019 11.3163 0.0598
2MB 956.895 3.017 4.071 0.018 13.8413 0.06081
TABLE VI: Performance of DDoS mitigation service during attacks (before and after “Scale Inside-out” (all in seconds))
in various metrics. However, the reduction in Sr helps in
achieving a huge reduction in the service downtime. Except the
2KB service, which has the least Sr , all the other services have
a service downtime ranging between∼600s-2400s. Another
important observation regarding the service downtime in the
cases when “Scale Inside-out” is used, is related to the
achieved stability in the service downtime to∼40s. Coming
to the impact of “Scale Inside-out” on the attack absorption,
we show the results in the form of various graphs in Figure 7.
With a huge reduction in the resource utilization factor from Sr
to Sattack , the number of connections Nmax reaches to a value
as high as∼50000 connections to absorb the attack as soon as
possible. Victim web services where the Sr is already very
low (2KB-100KB) show number of established connections
ranging between∼2000-20000 while we do not use “Scale
Inside-out”. However, after employing our approach, the rise in
number of connections also helps in achieving important goals
of reducing the overall downtime and other related effects. We
show the effects of our proposed approach on the collateral
damages to other critical services in Table VII. For better
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Fig. 7: No. of connections during attack (before and after Scale Inside Out)
comprehension, we show the performance of SSH test in the
form of SSH response times by various graphs in Figure 8.
Proposed approach removes the the collateral effects which
were formed by the victim service on SSH service. The huge
peaks in the response times, specially in the cases of web
services with a higher Sr are reduced to acceptable values.
Additionally, it is also visible that the collateral effects on
SSH service seems to disappear in case of Set 3 without
employing the proposed approach. However, a close look on
the maximum time taken in the request-response cycle in SSH
is more than double in all the cases where we use the proposed
approach.
These results also prove that the capacity scaling alone may
not solve all the collateral effects as the resource contention
highly depends upon the application type and its resource
utilization factor Sr . Therefore, even the Set 3 resources may
become resource contended for heavier services or attacks.
However, “Scale Inside-out” always shows the stable results
for various metrics for critical co-located services. In addition
to all these metrics, we also show an additional metric which is
quite important to understand the attack absorption dynamics.
We show the number of attack requests served by the victim
service under attack, before the attack is actually detected in
Table VIII. This metric is important from two perspectives,
first, the cost of outgoing bandwidth spend on responding to
these attack requests will be huge if the attack is not detected
in time. Second important aspect is the severity of resource
contention will be higher in the victim service keeps serving
the attack requests without the mitigation service actually
identifying them timely. The attack requests served before
detection, are heavily reduced in the cases when the “Scale
Inside-out” is used. In the case of higher Sr the number of
attack requests served before detection remains similar before
and after “Scale Inside-out”. This is due to the minimum
time required to complete the quick and dirty check by the
proposed approach. On the other hand, the capacity scaling
(Set 2 and Set 3) shows negative impact here as the scaled
resources serves more and more requests before getting a
detection trigger. After discussing the detailed results of the
evaluative experiments, we will now discuss various aspects of
the proposed approach. Following are various important usage
aspects related to the “Scale Inside-out” approach.
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R
es
ou
rc
es Type ssh ssh Time to Time to Max. Max. Min. Min. Average Average
down down complete complete ssh ssh ssh ssh ssh ssh
time time ssh test ssh test Time Time Time Time Time Time
(no SIO) (SIO) (no SIO) (SIO) (no SIO) (SIO) (no SIO) (SIO) (no SIO) (SIO)
Se
t
1
2KB 0 0 81.616 77.846 0.341 0.231 0.144 0.144 0.163 0.155692
50KB 0 0 82.016 81.045 0.332 0.283 0.145 0.146 0.164 0.16209
100KB 0 0 85.139 80.685 0.374 0.316 0.145 0.146 0.17 0.16137
500KB 0 0 84.779 81.127 0.409 0.489 0.146 0.146 0.169 0.162254
1MB 445.75 0 549.26 80.722 120.07 0.321 0.145 0.146 1.09853 0.161444
2MB 2269 0 2373.15 81.928 706.4 0.346 0.15 0.146 4.7463 0.163856
Se
t
2
2KB 0 0 84.54 78.389 0.458 0.223 0.148 0.147 0.169 0.156778
50KB 0 0 84.48 78.308 0.566 0.218 0.146 0.147 0.168 0.156616
100KB 0 0 83.622 78.347 0.441 0.331 0.145 0.146 0.167244 0.156694
500KB 0 0 84.262 78.977 0.474 0.47 0.146 0.146 0.168 0.157954
1MB 0 0 83.536 78.581 0.431 0.334 0.145 0.147 0.167072 0.157162
2MB 864.2 0 940.657 77.219 254.88 0.489 0.147 0.146 1.88131 0.154438
Se
t
3
2KB 0 0 81.1 78.389 0.419 0.223 0.145 0.147 0.162 0.156778
50KB 0 0 82.221 78.308 0.476 0.218 0.145 0.147 0.164442 0.156616
100KB 0 0 83.196 78.347 0.491 0.331 0.147 0.146 0.166392 0.156694
500KB 0 0 83.394 78.977 0.506 0.47 0.147 0.146 0.166788 0.157954
1MB 0 0 83.191 78.581 0.501 0.334 0.144 0.147 0.166382 0.157162
2MB 0 0 83.309 77.219 0.475 0.489 0.145 0.146 0.166618 0.154438
TABLE VII: SSH request-response behavior during attack (before and after “Scale Inside-out” (all in seconds))
Resources Type of the Victim Service2KB 50KB 100KB 500KB 1MB 2MB
Set 1 (No SIO) 5581 4115 794 30 6 4
Set 1 (SIO) 323 179 44 13 13 8
Set 2 (No SIO) 10820 6916 1542 198 24 20
Set 2 (SIO) 515 313 109 58 13 8
Set 3 (No SIO) 18825 12778 2920 487 170 20
Set 3 (SIO) 793 415 80 19 13 12
TABLE VIII: Number of Attack Requests Served Before Attack Detection
1. Attack Downtime: Many of the recent DDoS attacks show
the attack downtime ranging between few days to weeks and
the unavailability causes enormous losses [32]. During the
downtime, the legitimate customers will not get served, hence,
we utilize the idea of sacrificing the victim service resources
and make the resources available for the DDoS mitigation
service and other critical services.
2. Variable Sr : The real web services do not have a fixed
resource utilization factor for all the requests (except in the
cases of static services). We change the Sr to Sattack in all
the cases, however, variable Sr values for different resource
users/dependent services may be used to ensure a minimum
availability during the downtime.
3. Effects on other DDoS mitigation methods: The proposed
approach is independent of the DDoS mitigation method used
as it aims at providing resources to the mitigation service.
For most of the DDoS mitigation methods which work at the
network or the application level, proposed approach will be
helpful as it is able to absorb the attack data timely. However,
application layer filtering approach which are based on more
fine-grain user inputs may require additional support.
4. Attack Absorption: Our major aim and contribution in
this work is to expedite the attack absorption with minimizing
the attack absorption delay (Tabsorb). Methods requiring
additional data in mitigation may require other mechanisms.
5. Attackers are not interested in response: One important
argument in support of the reduction in Sr , is that the attackers
being mostly bots do not have any interest in the service
response. However the responses with reduced Sr may trigger
the bots to automatically increase/change the attack vectors
(guessing that the service is not down yet). This instigation
may also help the mitigation method to get the upcoming
attacks quickly for quick detection. 6. Legitimate users:
At first instance it may appear that the service is giving
unusable responses to the benign users. However, due to a
heavy reduction in downtime, the legitimate users are served
right after the attack detection.
7. Repeated/stealthy/sophisticated attacks: As discussed
in point number 5, the attacks which are undetectable or
requires additional efforts (at times manual efforts) should
show reduced effects if the proposed approach is used as the
Sattack will be minimum during the downtime. If the attacks
are repeated during the downtime, the detection will be quick
as the service is already using Sattack .
8. Sacrifice vs losses: In order to achieve the loss minimization
and quick availability, we are applying a forceful downtime
using “Scale Inside-out”. The sacrifice of service resources by
reducing the Sr results in minimizing the losses, which are
quite higher as compared to the losses due to this reduction.
9. Costs: Capacity scaling comes up with the additional cost
and in case of repeated/stealthy/sophisticated attacks it may
become quite high which may even question the sustainability
of the victim organization [33][22]. However, “Scale Inside-
out” approach also works well without the scaling methods.
10. “Scale Inside-out” vs. Shutdown: Proposed approach
may look like victim service/machine shutdown, as in the case
of shutdown the victim service administrator anticipates that
the attack will go away soon. However, without shutting the
service, we collect all the attack data and use the resources
to detect and mitigate the attack as quickly as possible.
Additional advantages as compared to the shutdown are as
listed in other points from 1 to 9.
VII. RELATED WORK
Cyber threats such as DDoS attacks remains a major re-
search area for the cyber security community. However, the
challenges posed by newer forms of DDoS attacks and their
variants bringing sophistication, require new and effective
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Fig. 8: SSH request-response behavior during attack (before and after Scale Inside Out)
solutions. DDoS attack models and defense methods are clas-
sified in the detailed surveys such as [34]. Authors in [15] gave
a detailed solution taxonomy related to DDoS attack solutions
for cloud computing. DDoS attacks in cloud computing and
the security assurance and protection are given in contribu-
tions such as [35] and [36]. Taxonomies and surveys such
as [37] [38] provide mitigation solutions related to emerging
DDoS attacks in the area of cloud computing with a special
emphasis on software defined networks (SDN). Similarly,
attack solutions in cloud computing are also complemented
by the paradigms such as big data analytics based detection
in [39]. Many authors also studied the novel characterization
of DDoS attacks and its variants on cloud computing and
advocated about the need of solutions specifically designed
for the on-demand computing model of cloud. Authors in [40]
show DDoS attacks on cloud data centers and observe impacts
beyond the downtime of the service. Authors showed effects
of attacks which may even result in switching off the victim
servers and permanent hardware damages. Authors in [41]
show newer DDoS attacks which result in power spikes in
the data center power utilization resulting in power over-
subscription by attack workloads. Authors in [42] show a
discussion on DDoS attacks which target the server bandwidth
to achieve the service denial. Authors in [43] provide puzzle
based solution to bandwidth based DDoS attacks. Authors pro-
vide attack algorithms of novel stealthy DDoS attacks in cloud
computing in contributions such as [44] [45]. These stealthy
attacks try to remain undetected by intelligently defeating the
attack filters.
There are two important features which differentiate a cloud
based victim service from a fixed infrastructure server. These
features are on-demand “Pay-as-you-Go” model of cloud
computing and multi-tenant nature of cloud infrastructure.
Idziorek et. al [46] showed the DDoS attack variant in the
form of fraudulent resource consumption (FRC). Economic
denial of sustainability attack (EDoS) [47] is similar to the
FRC attack where the attackers exploit the vulnerabilities
of on-demand resource scaling capability of victim cloud
services. Authors in [48] [47] present solutions which are
based on challenge response protocol such as CAPTCHAs to
prevent the exploitation of “Pay-as-you-Go” model. Authors
in [46][49] present traffic anomaly detection solution based
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on the session duration and the “Zipf” distribution. The multi-
tenant nature of cloud computing results into a new venue
of security threats among co-located VMs. Authors in [50]
show security threats among VMs hosted on the same physical
server. Similarly solutions such as [51] show resource con-
tention among co-located VMs at the level of I/O operations
and [52] show resource contention in network bandwidth
resources. Performance interference and resource contention is
a well studied aspect of virtualization technology and there are
number of characterization studies such as [28] [27]. Recent
DDoS characterization studies [22] extends the VM resource
contention to the DDoS attacks and show collateral damages
of DDoS attack effects on co-hosted VMs and overall cloud
resources including energy consumption effects. Similarly,
authors in [53] show effects of DDoS attacks on virtual
machines. Since the inception of cloud computing, there were
anticipations that the profound amount of resources available
in the cloud infrastructure will help in immediately curbing the
attack by resource scaling at victim end. There are industry
solutions such as [17][16][54] which aims at minimizing the
attack surface and expediting the attack absorption by resource
capabilities of cloud computing to be used during an attack.
Solutions such as[2] [55] [56] [57] provide methods which
scale the victim server resources in attack cases till the service
becomes normal. On the other hand, authors in [33] have
proposed a DDoS aware resource scaling algorithm which only
scale the resource if there is a presence of an attack. Authors
in [58] propose a moving target based mitigation mechanism in
which the hidden servers and ports are assigned to the users on
the go to create another interface between the real servers and
users. On the other hand, authors in [59] propose to migrate the
victim server under attack to reserved resources in anticipation
that the attack will be over soon.
Most of the DDoS attack solutions in the cloud contributed
towards resource scaling methods and other contributions show
resource contention among VMs on the same physical server.
Our proposed work shows a novel characterization where the
local resource contention among the operating system level
services (at the level of single victim VM) gets formed due
to the attack. We also show that the attack absorption being
the most important phase of attack mitigation may be delayed
due to these effects where capacity scaling may not help. As
per the related work, we believe that our proposed solution
provides a novel solution based on the reduction in resource
utilization factor per request during the attack.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we show that during massive and extreme
DDoS attacks, the victim service resources are stressed heav-
ily. The legitimate traffic coming to the victim services does
not get serviced during the downtime due to these attacks. In
addition to these effects collateral damages due to the heavy
resource contention delays the overall mitigation process. The
traffic flow in these attack cases is really huge which cannot
be timely absorbed by the victim machine with the available
resources. Most of the DDoS solutions use the dynamic scaling
capabilities of cloud computing to scale service instances to
absorb the attack quickly. The resource scaling capabilities
provided by profound and on-demand resources provide a
great help in mitigating the attacks quickly and restoring the
services back. Resource scaling allows quick collection of at-
tack data and features to expedite the attack detection and mit-
igation, however, it brings additional cost to the overall attack
mitigation. In addition to dynamic scaling of resources, we
argue that a reorganization and in-resource scaling of critical
bottleneck resources may fasten the overall mitigation process
further. Most of the DDoS mitigation tools/frameworks rely on
the incoming traffic features such as traffic rate/connections to
evaluate and segregate the traffic.
We show that the overall mitigation activity could be fas-
tened if the attack absorption delay which is the time between
the request arrival and request evaluation by the mitigation
method can be minimized. To minimize the attack absorption
delay, we propose to reduce the "Resource utilization" per
request during an attack. To showcase the efficacy of our
claims we also take the case of "number of connections"
as a critical resource as it directly affects the overall time
and efficiency of traffic data absorption during segregation
process. To increase the number of connections, we propose
to reconfigure the victim service to have a reduced resource
utilization per request during the downtime. This essentially
means that for each incoming request (during the attack), the
server does not perform the requested activity which forms the
resource contention. Additionally, this implementation fastens
the incoming traffic arrival and evaluation as this reconfig-
uration results into the establishment of a huge number of
connections which helps in absorbing the attack as quickly as
possible. We perform real time attack experiments on cloud
services to showcase the efficacy of our scheme. We also
believe that our proposed technique opens up a new direction
of "in-resource" scaling by which the attack data collection
leading to early attack mitigation can be achieved.
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